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Abstract
A global externality like the GHG emissions leading to climate change are both due to
free-riding at the individual level as well as the government level. A government aiming to
maximise domestic social welfare may make individuals internalise the damage within their
country, but will free-ride on the damage caused to other countries. Only a global cooperative
solution could internalise global damage entirely. If individuals have altruistic concern for
others but continue to believe that their consumption is negligible relative to the total, they
will not change their behaviour. However, this paper shows that in a multi-country setting
the global equilibrium levels of consumption for both the non-cooperative and cooperative
solutions are affected by altruism. The key results are (a) that non-cooperative governments
maximising domestic welfare will internalise some of the damage inflicted on other countries
depending on the level of altruistic concern individuals have, and (b) the cooperative global
optimum also changes as altruism leads individuals to effectively experience damage in other
countries as well as the direct damage to them. Since altruistic concern for others may vary
across countries, global welfare then becomes a function of the relative levels of altruistic
concern between countries.
Keywords Altruism · Climate change · Environmental economics · Environmental tax ·
Externalities · Pro-social behaviour · Public goods
JEL Classification Q50 · Q58 · D11 · D90
1 Introduction
Climate change resulting from greenhouse gas emissions is a truly global externality, arising
from free-riding behaviour both at the individual and government level. Aggregate global
emissions cause climate change, and therefore emissions in one country do not just cause
a negative externality in that country but also in every other country. At the same time, the
damage experienced from climate change may be much more significant in some countries
compared to others. Governments can implement an emissions tax to make individuals inter-
nalise the economic cost of their consumption causing emissions. Such a tax may reduce
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emissions to the degree that it maximises the welfare of that country, taking as given the
emissions in other countries and the resulting damage for that country, but ignoring the effect
of the country’s emissions on other countries. While this corrects for individuals’ free-riding
behaviour within a given country, it is now governments that are free-riding by ignoring
the effect the country’s emissions have on other countries. And if every country acts that
way, such a non-cooperative equilibrium will lead to higher emissions and lower welfare
compared to the global cooperative solution where global aggregate welfare is maximised
and global damage is fully internalised. For example, Ploeg and Zeeuw (1992) demonstrate
this outcome by modelling the Pigovian taxes for a global externality when each country
sets their own tax in a non-cooperative way and compare it to the global cooperative solu-
tion.1 Furthermore, Aronsson and Löfgren (2001) develop a dynamic two-country model of
a global externality and evaluate the non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria with regard
to valuation problems implicit in environmental accounting.
While we know that in the absence of a global regulator countries have no incentive to
cooperate, there are a number of approaches that aim to show how the cooperative global opti-
mum might be achieved nevertheless. For example, Barrett (1990) explores how cooperative
agreements might arise in case of global externalities. He first shows that the biggest discrep-
ancies between the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria arise for global externalities
that carry significant damage but are costly to reduce (such as climate change), and also for
low damage externalities that can be reduced at relatively low cost. He further summaries
a number of approaches that might lead to a cooperative equilibrium, among which is the
aspect of morality where governments may be guided by some moral concerns rather than
just maximising their countries’ welfare. Similarly, Barrett (1994) looks at self-enforcing
international agreements, which may either be modelled as members maximising the col-
lective net-benefits or as an infinitely repeated game. He shows that neither approach can
sustain full cooperative behaviour when the differences between the net benefits of the global
cooperative solution and the non-cooperative solution are large. When looking at interna-
tional cooperation in climate change policy, it is sometimes thought that if one country leads
with climate mitigation measures, others will follow. Game theory dictates that leadership in
climate action is generally not successful and will actually lead to a reduction in other coun-
tries’ efforts. However, Buchholz and Sandler (2017) show that this may be overcome when
elements of behavioural models are incorporated, for example when the follower country
has non-selfish preferences or the leader’s actions have an influence on the follower’s belief
about the leader’s behaviour.
Furthermore, while emission permit based mechanisms, such as used in the Kyoto proto-
col, are deemed to be of limited potential to establish sufficient international cooperation, there
are other proposals, for example the price influencing climate protection scheme put forward
by Nordhaus (2006).2 Altemeyer-Bartscher et al. (2010) further develop this approach by
proposing a scheme that includes side-payments. The literature also points to the importance
of measuring and considering the ancillary benefits of climate protection because regional
secondary benefits of climate protection efforts may overcome free-riding behaviour (e.g.
Markandya and Rübbelke 2004), and in particular in conjunction with side-payments or tax
transfers (e.g. Altemeyer-Bartscher et al. 2011; Markandya and Rübbelke 2012; Altemeyer-
1 They start with a simple static model with flow pollution but the bulk of the analysis focusses on a dynamic
approach with stock pollution.
2 This is “essentially a dynamic Pigovian pollution tax” (p. 32).
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Bartscher et al. 2014).3 Other contributions in the area of global externalities and taxation4
evaluate the effects of labour mobility (e.g. Aronsson and Blomquist 2003; Bierbrauer et al.
2013),5 non-competitive markets (e.g. Tahvonen 1995), Veblen effects (e.g. Aronsson and
Johansson-Stenman 2014, 2015),6 and the existence of abatement activities that only mitigate
local pollution in addition to those that mitigate global pollution (e.g. Pittel and Rübbelke
2017).
The potential for free-riding at the government level is of course a result of free-riding at
the individual level. This paper aims to combine the issues of free-riding at the individual level
and at the country level with the concept that individuals may exhibit altruistic concern for
others, in their own country and in other countries. Altruism in the form where an individual’s
utility is to some degree a function of others’ utility, but not a specific component of it, is
generally referred to as Pure Altruism.7 Applications of this type of altruism are often used in
smaller environments such as the family where one might care about the welfare of specific
individuals (for example Becker 1974, 1981). In large-scale contexts it can also be assumed
that an individual cares for the total or average welfare of all other individuals in the population
(e.g. Johansson 1997; Daube and Ulph 2016). The model developed in this paper is closely
linked to the model setup used in Daube and Ulph (2016) and extends their static model
of Pure Altruism to a setting of multiple countries. Their model demonstrates that as long
as individuals continue to believe that total emissions are unaffected by their consumption
choice, then no matter how much they care about the welfare of others, their behaviour will
not change.8 Furthermore, it shows in a single country context that the optimal tax is still
the standard Pigovian tax equal to social marginal damage. Daube and Ulph (2016) start
with a model of Pure Altruism, but its main contribution from there is the development
of an alternative theory of behaviour where individuals do not necessarily act in a utility-
maximising way, but may base their consumption decision on a hypothetical moral benefit
determined by asking what would be optimal if they and everybody else were to make the
same choice.9
3 The relevance of ancillary benefits goes back to the analysis of impure public goods first put forward by
Cornes and Sandler (1984) who showed that joint production of public and private goods may reduce the
problem of under-provision of the public good.
4 The theory on international tax competition and coordination between countries is an issue that has direct
significance for the development of environmental taxes as well. Keen and Konrad (2013) provide for a
thorough introduction on this topic.
5 Aronsson and Blomquist (2003) model optimal tax policy for trans-boundary environmental problems with
labour mobility. Using a two-type approach they show that ability has an impact on the optimal tax, but even
with labour mobility part of the externality remains uninternalised in a non-cooperative equilibrium. Only a
cooperative approach can fully internalise the externality. Bierbrauer et al. (2013) look at tax competition with
perfect labour mobility when skills are unobservable and show that the race-to-the-bottom problem also holds
in this setting.
6 Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2014) analyse the optimal provision of both national and global public
goods when individuals care about relative consumption levels, both relative to others in their country as well
as relative to individuals in other countries, but do not address the issue of taxation. Aronsson and Johansson-
Stenman (2015) take this forward by looking at the same care about relative consumption, but in relation
to optimal income taxation. They find that when tax policy is set by competing governments then they only
internalise the externality arising from the comparison within the country, but a Stackelberg leader will also
reflects between-country effects to some degree.
7 Paternalistic Altruism, on the other hand, means that an individual’s utility is not a function of others’ utility
as such, but a specific component of that utility (see Archibald and Donaldson 1976). In an environmental
context, this component may be the damage others experience from the dirty good.
8 This result is also consistent with the analysis of Johansson (1997) for large populations.
9 Daube and Ulph (2016) also contains a detailed overview on the literature of altruism and self-image effects.
123
M. Daube
The model in this paper will first be developed under standard theory with self-interested
individuals only, and then add individuals’ altruistic concern for the utility of others. Individ-
uals in any given country may exhibit a different level of altruistic concern for the total utility
in their own country compared to the concern for total utility in other countries. Indeed,
individuals can have different levels of altruistic concern for every country. Intuitively, it
is plausible to assume that an individual may care more for the well-being of the people
in their own country, or people closer to the individual, compared to individuals who may
live half way around the world. The analysis starts from individual behaviour but focusses
mostly on socially optimal levels of consumption under the non-cooperative solution where
governments individually aim to maximise their country’s welfare, and compares it to the
cooperative solution where global welfare is maximised. This paper makes no efforts to show
how such a global equilibrium may be achieved but simply compares the consumption levels
under those different equilibria. The main results are:
– Individuals’ altruistic concern for the welfare of others (Pure Altruism) will alter the
non-cooperative equilibrium resulting from domestic social planners and lead countries
to internalise some, but not all, of the damage caused by emissions in their country,
depending on the level of altruistic concern relative to the concern for themselves and
others in their country.
– However, altruistic concern will also alter the welfare-maximising global optimum,
requiring a lower level of emissions as individuals effectively experience damage from
the externality through
1. the direct effect of their country’s damage function on personal welfare, and
2. the effect of altruistic concern and thus the damage individuals in other countries
experience from the externality.
– Since socially optimal consumption in the global optimum then depends on the relative
levels of altruistic concern, the degree to which damage is internalised in each country
will now differ across countries and thus there is no single global tax rate to achieve the
optimum, contrary to the case of standard theory.
– In a non-cooperative equilibrium of two countries a population increase in one country
may either increase or decrease equilibrium consumption in another country, depending
on the relative size of the countries (with and without altruism).
The paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model setup. Section 3 will
then develop the general model and evaluate the results under standard theory. This serves
as counterfactual to the analysis with Pure Altruism in Sect. 4. Section 5 will then look at
comparative statics analysis with respect to population sizes, before Sect. 6 provides some
concluding remarks and presents ideas for potential further research.
2 Model Setup
We start with a continuum of individuals living in n discrete countries. Individuals within
a given country have the same initial endowment of income yi > 0, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. An
individual chooses consumption levels of a clean good x and a dirty good z, where the clean
good is a numeraire good with a price of 1, and therefore represents expenditure on all other
goods but the dirty good. Consumption of the clean good generates no externalities. The dirty
good, however, generates one unit of emissions per unit of consumption, which is a negative
externality to all individuals across all countries. The average consumption of the dirty good
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within country i is denoted by z¯i . The size of the population of each country i is measured
by Mi . Therefore total emissions in country i are captured by
Ei = Mi z¯i .





Ei = MT z¯T .
where MT measures the global population size and z¯T captures global average consumption
of the dirty good.
The damage individuals in country i experience from the negative emissions externality
of the dirty good is captured by the damage functions Di (ET ). A key component of this
multi-country model is that each country can experience different damage as a result of
the emissions externality and we have n different damage functions. Therefore this setup
also captures any ancillary costs of the emissions externality that are local to a particular
country. Note that the damage function is a function of ET , and therefore it is always total
global emissions that determine the damage experienced.10 Different countries may suffer
differently from those total emissions (i.e. different countries may have different damage
functions), but emissions in each country contribute equally to global emissions and every
country’s experienced damage is a consequence of the same total emissions. As such we are
modelling a truly global pollutant, in line with the aim of capturing some of the distinguishing
features of climate change. Formally, damage experienced by individuals in country i is given
by






∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where MT = ∑ni=1 Mi and z¯T = 1MT
∑n
i=1 Mi z¯i . Furthermore we have the global damage
function
DT (ET ) = 1MT
n∑
i=1
Mi Di (ET ), where D′T (ET ) > 0, D′′T (ET ) > 0, ∀ ET > 0.
From this it is also straightforward to derive that






Mi D′i (ET ) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
and
MT D′T (ET ) =
n∑
i=1
Mi D′i (ET ).
10 In a different setting one could also model that emissions generated in a particular country cause more dam-
age in that country and only a fraction of the emissions generated in other countries enter the damage function
for that country. For example, damage in country i could be given by the function Di (Ei + θi
∑
j =i E j ).
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Given the above, we can now define the utility derived from consumption of the two goods
by
ui (xi , zi ; ET ) = xi + φi (zi ) − Di (ET ) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (1)
where
φ′i (zi ) > 0, φ′′i (zi ) < 0; and D′i (ET ) > 0, D′′i (ET ) > 0, ∀ ET > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Damage experienced from the emissions externality is a strictly increasing and strictly
convex function of total global emissions for all positive levels of emissions. The private gross
benefit derived by individuals in country i from consumption of the dirty good is captured by
φi (zi ) and is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function of consumption of the dirty
good zi . The dirty good is produced with constant unit cost ci > 0, which again is the same
for individuals within country i but may differ across countries. In addition, governments of
the different countries impose an emissions tax ti ≥ 0 on consumption of zi . However, in
each country this tax revenue is redistributed to the individuals through a lump-sum transfer
σi which is identical for all individuals in country i . The government budget constraint for
country i is therefore defined by
σi = ti z¯i , ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2)
3 Standard Theory
We can now develop the model under standard theory, where individuals simply maximise
their own private utility of consumption without any altruistic concern for the utility of others.
3.1 Individual Behaviour
As shown in (1), individuals derive private utility from consumption of the two goods through
a quasi-linear utility function. Specifically, utility is linear in consumption of the clean good.
This ensures there are no issues of income distribution and welfare losses that may arise
are not due to inequality but inefficiencies. Furthermore, and also for simplicity, the utility
function assumes that individuals within a given country have the same preferences over
the two goods and therefore individuals within each country have identical utility functions.
However, preferences over the two goods may differ across countries.11
Given the definition of the government budget constraint in (2), the individual’s private
utility can be expressed as
ui (zi ; z¯i , z¯T , ti ) = (yi + ti z¯i ) − (ci + ti )zi + φi (zi ) − Di (ET ) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (3)
A key feature of this model is the atomistic nature of the consumption choice, formally
captured by the continuum of individuals. This means that the individual’s consumption
choice has no impact on total emissions and the damage experienced, as well as no impact on
the government budget constraint. The consequence of those two fundamental assumptions
11 The model could be developed such that preferences differ within each country, but this would make the
analysis more complex without adding to the key theme addressed in this paper. Rather than saying that all
individuals in a given country actually have identical preferences, one could think of the utility function as a
representative average function for that country.
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is that individuals take total global emissions, and therefore the damage experienced from
the emissions externality, as given. An individual in country i will choose their consumption
of the dirty good by maximising their utility shown in (3). Using the first order condition it
is then straightforward to show that the consumption choice for an individual in country i ,
denoted by z˜i (t), is characterised by12
φ′i [z˜i (t)] = ci + ti ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (4)
The left hand side of (4) describes the marginal private gross benefit from consumption
of the dirty good while the right hand side describes the private marginal cost. Indeed this
is the same result as in Daube and Ulph (2016), the only difference being that individuals
in different countries may have different private preferences over consumption of the dirty
good, may be subject to differences in the production cost of the dirty good, and have their
government impose a different tax on the dirty good.
3.2 Domestic Social Planner
We have two possible approaches for the social welfare functions. The first is the non-
cooperative approach where governments aim to maximise total welfare for their country
only (taking consumption in all other countries as given). This will be called the ‘Domestic
Planner’ approach. The second approach is the cooperative global solution where global
welfare (i.e. the sum of all countries’ welfare functions) is maximised. This is labelled
‘Global Planner’.
We start by looking at the optimal level of consumption from the Domestic Planner’s
perspective. For this let us first define z¯−i = ∑ j =i z¯ j and M−i z¯−i =
∑
j =i M j z¯ j , which
captures the total consumption of the dirty good across all countries other than country
i . Because individuals in country i have identical and strictly concave utility functions,
everybody in country i consumes the same amount of the dirty good in the domestic optimum.
Therefore country i’s social utility function is given by
Si (zi ; z¯−i ) = yi − ci zi + φi (zi ) − Di (Mi zi + M−i z¯−i ) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (5)
The Domestic Planner takes into account the link between the taxes paid on the dirty good
and the lump-sum transfer individuals receive through the government budget constraint. This
means the socially optimal level of consumption is independent of the tax rate. Furthermore,
the Domestic Planner also takes account of the connection between consumption of the
dirty good in country i and global emissions ET . However, in the multi-country context the
Domestic Planner also has to take into account consumption of the dirty good in all other
countries because the damage experienced in country i is a function of global emissions
which is in turn determined by the consumption of the dirty good in each of the n countries.
Since we are dealing with a non-cooperative situation, the standard Nash assumption where
the planner takes consumption in all other countries as given applies. The optimal level






= ci + Mi D′i
(
Mi zˆDi + M−i z¯−i
)
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (6)
12 Here and subsequently all the relevant second-order conditions are assumed to hold.
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The above shows that the socially optimal level is achieved when the private marginal
gross benefit of consumption is equal to the social marginal cost of consumption in country
i . This characterisation of the socially optimal level of consumption is similar to that of
the single country model developed by Daube and Ulph (2016). The characterisation fully
internalises the damage experienced in country i and takes full account of the government
budget constraint and the redistribution of the tax revenues. However, since the Domestic
Planner optimises only domestic welfare, this socially optimal level ignores the effect of
consumption in country i on the damage experienced in other countries. This is of course an
illustration of the free-riding behaviour countries may engage in by ignoring the effects of
their actions on other countries.13
Result 1 In a multi-country setting a domestic social planner will free-ride on the damage
caused by consumption in their country but experienced in the other countries.
This result is similar to Ploeg and Zeeuw (1992), although their model has identical
damage functions for all countries. Now, by comparing (4) and (6) it is straightforward to see
that the optimal tax on the dirty good in country i inducing everyone in country i to consume
the socially optimal level is
tˆ Di = Mi D′i
(
Mi zˆDi + M−i z¯−i
)
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (7)
3.3 Global Social Planner
In contrast to the Domestic Planner a Global Social Planner aims to maximise global welfare
across all n countries. This global welfare function consists of the sum of all countries’ social
welfare functions and is therefore given by






yi − ci zi + φi (zi ) − Di (M1z1 + · · · + Mnzn)
]}
. (8)
In the case of the Domestic Planner each country took consumption in every other country
as given. However, the Global Planner maximises aggregate welfare and therefore simulta-
neously chooses the globally optimal consumption level of the dirty good for each of the n
countries. This cooperative global optimum for country i is characterised by





M1 zˆG1 + · · · + MnzˆGn
)
= ci + MT D′T
(
M1 zˆG1 + · · · + MnzˆGn
)
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(9)
Contrary to the case of the Domestic Planner, (9) shows that in a global equilibrium global
damage of consumption of the dirty good is fully internalised in each country. This means
that consumption in country i does not just internalise the damage experienced in country
i , but also the damage in all other countries. It also means that if preferences over the dirty
good and the cost of production were the same for each country (φ(z) = φi (z) and c = ci ,
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n), then we would have the same level of optimal consumption in each of the
13 Note that if the damage function in country i were linear in total global emissions E , then marginal damage
would be constant and therefore marginal damage would be independent of consumption in other countries.
In that case both the socially optimal consumption level and the corresponding optimal tax on the dirty good
would be independent of consumption elsewhere.
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n countries. It is important to note that it would be the same level of consumption for each
country regardless of their size or damage function. This is because global damage is now
equally distributed across all individuals globally and each individual carries an equal share
of global damage. The global optimum is driven by global marginal damage rather than the
damage experienced in each country. A key factor for this result is the assumption that it
is total global emissions that cause the damage experienced in each country. Note that if
only a fraction of the emissions caused in other countries would contribute to the damage
experienced in country i (as mentioned in Sect. 2), then the global optimum would not
internalise global emissions equally, but country i would only internalise other countries’
emissions to the extent that they spill over to other countries.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in the global social optimum consumption in country
i internalises the damage experienced in country i as a result of a consumption change in
country i as well as the damage experienced in country j as a result of a consumption change
in country j , which is why it equates to internalising global damage. To illustrate this point,
let us look at a simplified case with two countries. Then the global social optimum for country





= c1 + M1 D′1
(




M1 zˆG1 + M2 zˆG2
)
. (10)
The last part of this is the marginal damage experienced in country 2 as a result of a
marginal increase of average consumption in country 2. However, this is not the same as the
marginal damage experienced in country 2 as a result of a marginal increase in consumption
in country 1, which would capture the damage inflicted by country 1 on country 2. Yet, we





= c1 + M1 D′1
(






M1 zˆG1 + M2 zˆG2
)
. (11)
Then we see that the global optimum internalises the damage inflicted by country 1 on
country 2, adjusted for the relative population sizes. Intuitively this is the case because
the Global Planner optimises the joint welfare functions across both countries, which is of
course weighted by the different population sizes and thus even a global optimum does not
necessarily require that the damage inflicted on another country is fully internalised within
one country, but the Global Planner is able to distribute the degree of internalisation such
that global welfare is maximised by each country internalising global damage caused by
consumption of the dirty good across all countries.
Result 2 A global social planner fully internalises global damage and ensures that each
individual carries an equal share of global damage. If private preferences over the dirty
good and the cost of production of the dirty good are the same for all individuals globally
(i.e. φ(z) = φi (z) and c = ci ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n), then all individuals will consume the same amount
of the dirty good under the global social optimum regardless of the countries’ population
sizes and damage experienced from the externality.
Comparing (4) and (9), it is then straightforward to see that the global optimum can be
achieved by a single tax rate imposed on each country. This globally optimal tax on the dirty
good is equal to global marginal damage, or
tˆi = tˆ = MT D′T
(
M1 zˆG1 + · · · + MnzˆGn
)
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (12)
This is an important result because if a cooperative solution could be achieved, the optimum
could be induced through a single tax rate on the dirty good for all countries. This would
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not just be simpler to implement in practice, it also is a fair solution since it imposes the
same tax on each individual globally while consumption can still differ in line with private
preferences over the dirty good.
Result 3 The global social optimum can be achieved by a single tax on the dirty good applied
to each country, equal to global marginal damage of consumption of the dirty good.
After having developed the model under standard theory we can now begin to explore
how these results change when individuals exhibit altruistic concern for the utility of others.
4 Pure Altruism
This paper uses Pure Altruism in the sense that individuals’ utility is a function of the
direct utility of all other individuals in the population rather than just specific individuals.14
However, given the multi-country setup, the individual can have a different level of altruistic
concern for others’ utility in their country compared to others’ utility in other countries.
Indeed, the individual may have a different level of altruistic concern for each of the n
countries. The degree of altruistic concern of individuals in country i for an individual in
country i is captured by the parameter αi i ≥ 0, while altruistic concern of individuals in
country i for an individual in country j is captured by αi j ≥ 0.15 Therefore the total level
of altruistic concern an individual in country i has for the whole population of country i is
given by αi i Mi , and similarly the total level of altruistic concern an individual in country i
has for the whole population of country j is given by αi j M j . Since the degree of altruism is
defined as the degree of care for an individual, and the degree of altruism is assumed to be
equal for all individuals in that country, the total weight of altruistic concern is greater the
larger the population, given a fixed level of α. This reflects the idea that while an individual
could have a very high level of altruistic concern for individuals in a very small country, this
will be offset to some degree by the fact that a large amount of people are affected by the
emissions externality in another country, even though the concern for each individual may be
lower. Furthermore, in order to maintain the reasonable assumption that the individual cares





M jαi j ≤ 1 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (13)
As will become evident, this assumption is crucial to the interpretation of the results. The
condition above effectively ensures that the welfare derived directly from consumption of
the dirty good does not become negligible compared to the welfare derived from altruistic
concern for others.16 Also note that for simplicity this paper assumes that all individuals
in any particular country have the same levels of altruistic concern, but altruistic concern
between countries is of course allowed to differ.
14 See for example Johansson (1997) and Hammond (1987).
15 Note that the altruism parameter is assumed to be non-negative since a negative α would not capture a
degree of altruism but rather some type of ‘Schadenfreude’.
16 This approach is consistent with the same argument made in Johansson (1997).
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4.1 Individual Behaviour
This section will refer to an individual’s utility function that includes utility derived from
altruistic concern as the individual’s ‘welfare’.17 An individual’s personal welfare is given
by the sum of their direct utility of consumption and the total utility of all other individuals
weighted by the corresponding degrees of altruistic concern, αi j . Therefore we have




αi j M j u¯ j (.) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (14)
where u¯ j (.) captures the average personal utility of individuals in country j . Note that
individuals have altruistic concern for the direct utility derived from their consumption choice,
but no altruistic concern for the indirect utility others derive from their altruistic concern.
This is done to avoid a loop effect where one individual would be affected by another’s
altruistic concern for that individual. From (14) it is straightforward to determine that due
to the atomistic nature of consumption, the individual’s consumption choice has no impact
on the utility of others, neither in their own country nor in any other country, and therefore
the individual’s consumption choice is still characterised by (4). Thus altruism has no effect
on an individual’s consumption choice. However, it may affect the socially optimal levels of
consumption as we will determine in the next section. Just as we did for standard theory we
will look at two cases of social welfare optimisation, under a Domestic Planner and under a
Global Planner.
4.2 Domestic Social Planner
The Domestic Planner maximises total welfare in their country. We assume that total welfare
is simply the sum of all individuals’ welfare including the effects of altruistic concern for
others. Therefore the social welfare function for a Domestic Planner is given by




αi j M j S j (.)
}




αi j M j S j (.)
}
= (1 + αi i Mi )
[






αi j M j
[
(y + t j z¯ j ) − (c + t j )z¯ j + φ(z¯ j ) − D j (Mi zi + M−i z¯−i )
]}
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (15)
We still have identical personal welfare functions for all individuals in country i and
therefore in the domestic optimum, each individual in country i will consume the same
amount of the dirty good. Maximising the social welfare function we find that the domestically
17 This is of course a personal welfare function rather than a social welfare function.
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optimal level of consumption of the dirty good is characterised by




{ αi j M j
1 + αi i Mi Mi D
′
j (Mi zˆi + M−i z¯−i )
}
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (16)
The above characterises the reaction function for each country analogous to those in
Sect. 3.2 leading to the non-cooperative Nash Equilibrium. Daube and Ulph (2016) found
that in the single country setting the level of altruistic concern for the utility of others has
no impact on the socially optimal level of consumption. However, from (16) we see that
altruism does affect the domestic optimum in a multi-country setting. Taking a closer look
we can see that the degree to which the damage experienced in country i is internalised is
independent of the level of altruistic concern individuals in country i may have for others
in their country. This is consistent with the results of the model in Daube and Ulph (2016).
However, we also see that the degree to which damage experienced in the other countries as
the result of consumption in country i is internalised by the Domestic Planner is driven by
the relative levels of altruistic concern. The key factor in this multi-country setting is that the
chosen level of consumption by the Domestic Planner affects total emissions and thus also
has an impact on the damage experienced in the other country, which in turn has an impact
on domestic welfare driven by their level of altruistic concern for other countries’ welfare.
To clarify this, note that if individuals in country i did not have any altruistic concern
for the individuals in any other country (i.e. if αi j = 0 ∀ j = i), then this would be the
same as under standard theory shown in (6). However, since individuals may have altruistic
concern for individuals in the other countries (potentially a different level for each country),
the damage experienced in country j = i , but caused as a result of consumption in country i ,
now also enters the socially optimally level of consumption in country i . Furthermore, note
that the degree to which this influences the domestic optimum is not simply a function of
the altruistic concern for the other country, but the level of altruistic concern for the other
country relative to the concern for their own private utility and altruistic concern for their
own country. This means that the lower the altruistic concern for the other country compared
to the concern for their own country, the less of the damage caused to other countries will be
internalised.
To get a clearer picture of how exactly the level of altruistic concern influences the domestic
optimum it is helpful to look at the simpler case of just two countries. Then the equivalent of





= c1 + M1 D′i (M1 zˆ1 + M2 z¯2) +
α12 M2
1 + α11 M1 M1 D
′
2(M1 zˆ1 + M2 z¯2). (17)
The coefficient α12 M21+α11 M1 determines to what degree the damage inflicted on country 2 is
internalised, and captures the level of altruistic concern for country 2 relative to the total
weight given to the individual’s private utility of consumption (equal one) and their altruistic
concern for all other individuals in country 1.
Due to the constraint on the total level of altruistic concern relative to the private utility
of consumption as defined in (13), which is α11 M1 + α12 M2 ≤ 1 in the two country case,
and assuming that there is at least some degree of altruistic concern for domestic welfare
if there is concern for the other country (i.e. α11 > 0 if α12 > 0), then we know that
α12 M2
1+α11 M1 < 1. Therefore the Domestic Planner will never fully internalise the damage caused
by consumption in country 1 but experienced in country 2. The only way for the damage to
be fully internalised is if there were no domestic altruism (α11 = 0) while at the same time
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having the maximum level of altruistic concern for the other country (α12 M2 = 1). However,
this special case could only occur in the case of two countries. When there are more than
two countries, none of the coefficients could be equal to one. We can therefore generalise
this result to the n-country case and say that for n > 2 the Domestic Planner will never
fully internalise the damage imposed on any other country caused by consumption in their
country, regardless of the level of altruistic concern (given the conditions imposed on the size
of altruistic concern). While, unlike in the single country model, the level of altruism does
matter to the Domestic Planner, and the impact of consumption on damage experienced in
other countries is internalised to some degree, it is not fully internalised.
Result 4 In a multi-country setting altruistic concern for the welfare of individuals in another
country is necessary for a Domestic Planner to internalise to some degree the damage inflicted
on another country as a result of domestic consumption. The degree to which damage in other
countries is internalised depends on the altruistic concern for the other country relative to the
concern for the individuals direct utility and the welfare of others in that country. However,
for any n > 2 the Domestic Planner will never fully internalise the damage inflicted on
another country, regardless of the levels of altruistic concern, given the constraints on the
levels of altruistic concern as defined in (13).
From (16) we can also derive that ∂ zˆ
D
i
∂αi j < 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, where i = j . This makes
intuitive sense. As the degree of altruistic concern increases relative to the concern for their
own country, individuals will internalise more of the other countries’ damage and the resulting




> 0 ∀ 1 ≤
i ≤ n. An increase in the altruistic concern for the utility of their own country lowers the
relative importance of the damage experienced in other countries and therefore country i can
consume more under the domestic equilibrium. Here it is of course important to keep in mind
that a decrease in the country i’s consumption will also have an effect on the equilibrium
consumption in all other countries. Furthermore, as we have established in detail in Sect. 3.2,
the Nash Equilibrium level of consumption under the Domestic Planner is a function of the
relative population sizes and damage experienced in the other countries, regardless whether
there is altruistic concern or not.18
So far we have looked at this social optimum as internalising the damage inflicted on
another country. However, we can also evaluate whether the levels of altruistic concern could
be sufficient to induce a Domestic Planner to internalise global damage. To investigate this





= c1 + M1 D′i (M1 zˆ1 + M2 z¯2) +
α12 M1
1 + α11 M1 M2 D
′
2(M1 zˆ1 + M2 z¯2). (18)
This is exactly the same as before only rewritten such that the last part of the equation
captures the marginal damage experienced in country 2 as the result of a consumption change
in country 2. It shows that the damage in country 2 is internalised to the degree defined by
the coefficient α12 M11+α11 M1 . If this coefficient is equal to one, the Domestic Planner will fully
internalise global damage, the same as the Global Planner would determine under standard
theory without altruism. We know that this is the case if
(α12 − α11)M1 = 1.
From this we see immediately that the condition requires that α12 > α11, which means it
requires that the level of altruistic concern for the other country is larger than it is for their
18 Assuming non-linear damage functions.
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own country. Furthermore, we can also rewrite this condition as





We know that the left hand side of (19) is greater than one due to the constraint imposed
earlier on the total level of altruistic concern relative to the private utility of consumption
(α11 M1 + α12 M2 ≤ 1). Therefore for the condition to hold, we require M1 to be larger than
M2 and in such a way that the ratio between the sum of the concern for the individual’s private
utility and the welfare of all others in the same country, and the concern for individuals in
the other country, is the same as the ratio between the population sizes of the two countries.
Intuitively this means that the size of country 2 has to be sufficiently small and the level
of altruistic concern for the other country be sufficiently larger than the concern for the
domestic welfare in order for the altruistic concern to have enough weight in the domestic
social welfare function that it fully internalises the damage of country 2. In the n-country
case this would have to hold for each of the other countries and for this to be consistent with
the restriction in (13), country 1 has to become larger and larger relative to all other countries
the more countries there are.19 It is noteworthy that it is counter-intuitive that this condition
would actually hold, since it is reasonable to expect that the level of altruistic concern for the
welfare in another country is not greater than the level of concern for welfare in their own
country.
We have already determined earlier that equilibrium consumption in country 1 will





and that equilibrium consumption in country 1 will increase with an increase in the level of




> 0). We have already established that it
is the relative levels of altruism that matter. Therefore let us define the following parameters
representing the level of altruistic concern by individuals in country 1 and country 2 for the








1 + α22 M2 . (20)
It is these parameters that dictate to what degree the damage in another country is inter-







φ′′2 (.) − AD2 M1 M2 D′′1 (.) − M22 D′′2 (.)
]}
< 0, (21)
where |HD| = φ′′1 (.)
[






1 (.) + AD1 M1 M2 D′′2 (.)
]
> 0.
As we would expect, consumption in country 1 decreases as the relative level of altruistic
concern for country 2 increases. However, equilibrium consumption in country 1 also depends
on consumption in country 2. Since we know that an increase in AD2 will decrease consumption
in country 2, we can deduce that this means that consumption in country 1 will increase.







M1 M2 D′′1 (.) + AD1 M22 D′′2 (.)
]}
> 0. (22)
19 For example in the case of three countries we would require that M1 ≥ 2M2 and M1 ≥ 2M3.
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This shows that consumption in country 1 increases as the relative level of altruistic concern
by individuals in country 2 for country 1 increases. This is consistent with our earlier findings.
Note that AD2 does not affect the consumption choice of country 1 directly but only through










This illustrates that as AD2 increases, consumption in country 2 decreases in line with the
equivalent of (21) for country 2. And since consumption in country 2 decreases, consumption
in country 1 increases.
We can now turn to see how the socially optimum level from the perspective of a Global
Planner is affected by the presence of Pure Altruism.
4.3 Global Social Planner
As before, the Global Planner simultaneously maximises the joint welfare functions of all n
countries. Therefore total global welfare is given by






(1 + αi i Mi )Si (.) +
∑
j =i
[αi j M j S j (.)]
]}
. (23)
Taking the first order condition with respect to zi , it is then straightforward to derive that





= ci + Mi D′i
(






1 + ∑nh=1[αhj Mh]
1 + ∑nh=1[αhi Mh]
M j D′j
(
M1 zˆG1 + · · · + MnzˆGn
)}
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(24)
The above shows that—just as in the case of the Domestic Planner—the damage in country
i is fully internalised, but the degree to which damage in the other countries is internalised
depends on the relative levels of altruistic concern. Although this relative level of altruism
is different from the Domestic Planner case, it shows that it is by no means given that the
Global Planner fully internalises global damage equally in each country. One may intuitively
expect that for a Global Planner the degrees of altruistic concern would cancel out somehow
and we would still arrive at the same global optimum as described under standard theory in
(9). However, this is not the case and altruism clearly does matter. In order to get a better
understanding of what exactly is going on, let us look at the simplified case of only two





=c1 + M1 D′1
(
M1 zˆG1 +M2 zˆG2
)
+ 1 + α12 M1 + α22 M2








The first point that is evident from (25) is that the degree to which damage in country 2
is internalised does not just depend on the relative level of altruistic concern in country 1
for their own country and country 2 (as is the case for the Domestic Planner), but now the
combined levels of altruistic concern in both countries for country 2 relative to the combined
levels of altruistic concern in both countries for country 1 drive the degree to which damage
in country 2 is internalised. This is because the Global Planner maximises the joint global
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welfare function that also includes the effect of country 2 on country 1, and their levels of
altruistic concern. Indeed, it is straightforward to see that if in both countries the level of
altruistic concern is at the same level for their own country as it is for the other country (or
in other words α11 = α12 and α22 = α21), then the coefficient is equal to 1, and the socially
optimal level fully internalises global damage (i.e. φ′1(zˆG1 ) = c1 + MT D′T (M1 zˆG1 + M2 zˆG2 )).
And of course it is also evident that in this case the socially optimal level in country 2 fully
internalises damage in country 1 as well, and we have the same optimum as under standard
theory without altruism. To generalise this to the n-country case we would require αi i = αi j
∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. But because the levels of altruistic concern may be different for each country,
and each of those parameters enters the global welfare function, the global optimum with
Pure Altruism may very well be different from the standard theory result where each country
internalises global damage to the same degree. Also note that even if there is only altruistic
concern by individuals for their own countries (αi j = 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i = j) then the
global optimum is still not the same as under standard theory unless the degree of altruistic
concern within each country is also the same.
However, it is not strictly necessary to have exactly the same levels of altruistic concern
for the other countries as for their own country in order for the coefficient for the marginal
damage of the other country to be 1. More generally we can see that the marginal damage in
the other country will be fully internalised if
α11 − α12




Let us refer to the difference between the altruistic concern for their own country and the
concern for the other country as the ‘additional domestic altruism’ (e.g. α11 −α12), assuming
for simplicity that the altruistic concern for their own country is larger than for the other
country. Then we can see from the above that if the relative level of additional domestic
altruism in both countries is equal to the inverse of the relative size of the two countries the
global optimum will internalise global damage equally for each country. In the n-country
case this requirement becomes a little more complicated. In order for the damage of country
j to be fully internalised in the socially optimum consumption of country i we would require
the population weighted additional domestic altruism in country i to be equal to the sum of
the population weighted additional altruism for country j relative to country i by all other
countries. Specifically we would require




(αhj − αhi )Mh
} ∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i = j . (26)
The above condition is necessary for the global optimum to equally internalise global
damage in each country. However, the key intuition behind a global social optimum including
degrees of Pure Altruism in the welfare function is that one country may internalise more of
the damage due to the relative levels of altruism compared to another country. Indeed, if the
population weighted sum of the altruistic concern for country j across all countries is greater
than the sum of population weighted altruistic concern for country i , then the social optimum
for country i would imply internalising more than global marginal damage. Of course in turn
country j’s optimal consumption level would internalise less than global marginal damage.
If, in a two-country example, country 1 has a large amount of altruistic concern for the
welfare of country 2 but country 2 has a low level of altruistic concern for the welfare of
individuals in country 1 but a high level of concern for the welfare of their own country, then
the global welfare function will put more weight on the damage experienced in country 2
than a Global Planner would do under standard theory. Altruistic concern of individuals in
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country 1 for country 2 means that the individuals in country 1 do not just experience the
damage directly, but they also suffer to some degree the damage the individuals in country 2
experience. Therefore they are affected more by the externality than they would be without
altruism.
Result 5 In a multi-country setting the socially optimal level of consumption from a Global
Planner’s perspective is driven by the relative levels of altruistic concern. If, in each country,
the levels of altruistic concern for the domestic welfare is the same as the level of altruistic
concern for welfare in all other countries, then the social optimum internalises the global
damage equally across each country. However, if the relative levels of altruistic concern for a
particular country by other countries are large, the welfare of that country—and therefore the
damage function of that country—will carry more weight in determining the global optimum.
Comparing both the optimal consumption levels under the Domestic Planner with that of
the Global Planner, we can further determine that as long as the level of altruistic concern
for domestic welfare is larger than the level of concern for the welfare in other countries
(i.e. αi i > αi j ∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i = j), then the global social optimum will lead to a lower
consumption level of the dirty good compared to the domestic social optimum. This makes
intuitive sense since the Global Planner would, on average, internalise more of the global
effect of the externality than a Domestic Planner could achieve through the effect of altruism
alone.
Finally, similar to the Domestic Planner case, let us look at how the relative levels of
altruism for each country affect the global optimum. To do that, we define the following
parameters representing the total level of altruism for one country and the direct utility of
consumption relative to the total level of altruism for the other country and the direct utility
from consumption. These are
AG1 =
1 + α12 M1 + α22 M2
1 + α11 M1 + α21 M2 , A
G
2 =
1 + α11 M1 + α21 M2
1 + α12 M1 + α22 M2 . (27)







As we would expect, if the level of altruistic concern for country 2 (by either country)
increases relative to the altruistic concern for country 1, the optimal consumption level in
country 1 decreases, because then the welfare of country 2 has more weight in the global
welfare function compared to country 1. Similarly, if the altruistic concern for country 1
increases relative to the altruistic concern for country 2, the optimal consumption level for
country 1 increases.
We have now completed the analysis of the non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria
in the presence of Pure Altruism. The next step is to see how the optimal tax to induce this
optimal behaviour under both the Domestic Planner and the Global Planner has changed
compared to standard theory.
4.4 Optimal Tax
We have seen in Sect. 4.1 that adding Pure Altruism to the individual’s utility function does
not alter individual behaviour due to the atomistic nature of the consumption decision in this
model. However, we have also determined that altruistic concern for other countries does
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influence the socially optimal level of consumption, whether this is the level determined
through the non-cooperative equilibrium as a result of Domestic Planners or the global
optimum determined by the cooperative solution of the Global Planner. This is a key difference
compared to the results under standard theory as well as compared to a single country model
with Pure Altruism.
Yet, because individual behaviour is unaffected by their altruism, under both solutions
discussed every individual in country i still consumes the same amount of the dirty good and
we can induce this solution through a tax on the dirty good. For the Domestic Planner, it is
straightforward to derive that the required tax on the dirty good is
tˆ Di = Mi D′i
(
Mi zˆDi + M−i z¯−i
)
+ Mi
1 + αi i Mi
∑
j =i
αi j M j D′j
(
Mi zˆDi + M−i z¯−i
)
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (28)
As under standard theory, this tax may be different for each country depending on their
damage function. In addition, it is now also a function of the altruistic concern individuals
in this country may have. However, we also see now that, unlike under standard theory, to
achieve the global optimum we cannot impose the same tax in every country and need to
have a different tax for each country depending on the relative levels of altruistic concern.
As such the required tax for country i to induce the global optimum is
tˆ Gi = Mi D′i
(






1 + ∑nh=1[αhj Mh]
1 + ∑nh=1[αhi Mh]
M j D′j
(
Mi zˆGi + M−i zˆG−i
)}
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (29)
As already discussed in the previous section, the required tax on the dirty good would only
be the same for each country if for each country the degree of altruistic concern for their own
country is the same as that for every other country. Even if that were the case, it means that
inducing the global optimum requires significantly more information about individuals and
the damage caused in individual countries; knowledge about global damage is not sufficient
anymore. Not only does the Global Planner require information about the various levels of
altruistic concern, but also about the different damage functions for each country. This is
important because with altruistic concern, even if a cooperative solution can be achieved, it
is not straightforward for policy makers to determine the Pigovian tax for each country.
Result 6 With Pure Altruism in a multi-country setting the cooperative global (first-best)
solution can no longer be induced by a single global tax on the dirty good unless in each
country the levels of altruistic concern for the domestic welfare are the same as the concern
for welfare in all other countries.
5 The Eﬀect of Population Sizes
Throughout the analysis it has been evident that the marginal damage experienced is a function
of the population sizes. This section aims to show how the different equilibria are affected
when a population size changes. As before this will first be done under standard theory and
then for the case with Pure Altruism.
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5.1 Standard Theory
Domestic Social Planner
The damage function is non-linear in total emissions E , and therefore, as we have already
noted earlier, marginal damage is a function of the average consumption level in all other
countries. Therefore (6) describes the reaction function leading to the Nash equilibrium. In
order to explore the equilibrium level of consumption, let us now assume there are only two






= c1 + M1 D′1
(
M1 zˆD1 + M2 zˆD2
)
. (30)
We already know that consumption in country 1 depends on consumption in country 2
and vice versa. Specifically, we can determine that the degree to which optimal consumption




= M1 M2 D
′′
1 (.)




= M1 M2 D
′′
2 (.)
φ′′2 (.) − M22 D′′2 (.)
< 0. (31)
It makes intuitive sense that consumption in one country will decrease as consumption
in the other country increases. This is because if consumption in one country increases this
also increases marginal damage in the other country and therefore the social optimum under
the Domestic Planner has to decrease in the other country. From this we can also determine
the conditions in the two-country case that need to hold in order to have a unique and stable
Nash Equilibrium where both countries consume positive amounts of the dirty good. For this
we require | ∂ zˆD1
∂ zˆD2
| < 1 and ∂ zˆD2
∂ zˆD1
| < 1.20 These conditions are









Given one country is bigger than the other, then one of the two conditions will always hold.
However, the other is more restrictive and essentially guarantees that one country is not too
large compared to the other. Depending on the damage function and the total population, it
is possible that one country is so large that the marginal damage increases to a level where
it can no longer consume a positive amount of the dirty good given the optimal level of
consumption in the other country with a smaller population and lower marginal damage.
Next, assuming that a stable and unique equilibrium exists, let us analyse how changes in
the population size affect the non-cooperative equilibrium. We can derive from (30) and the







D′1(.) + M1 zˆD1 D′′1 (.)
] − M22 D′1(.)D′′2 (.)
φ′′1 (.)φ′′2 (.) − φ′′2 (.)M21 D′′1 (.) − φ′′1 (.)M22 D′′2 (.)
< 0. (33)
Therefore an increase in the population size of country 1 leads to lower consumption of
the dirty good in country 1 under the Domestic Planner. This makes intuitive sense as an
increase in population leads to an increase in marginal damage which has to be offset by
lower consumption levels. However, since the Domestic Planner has to take account of the
emissions generated in other countries it is also important to explore how consumption in




other countries might change with an increase in the population of country 1. Consumption
in country 2 will be affected by the total emissions in country 1, and these are of course a
function of the size of country 1 as well as the level of consumption of the dirty good in
country 1. Yet it is not definitive whether consumption in country 2 will increase or decrease.







φ′′1 (.)zˆD1 + M1 D′1(.)
]
φ′′1 (.)φ′′2 (.) − φ′′2 (.)M21 D′′1 (.) − φ′′1 (.)M22 D′′2 (.)




The above shows that consumption in country 2 will increase as a result of a population
increase in country 1 if consumption in country 1 is less than the ratio between the marginal
damage experienced in country 1 and the rate at which the marginal private gross benefit
derived from consumption of the dirty good changes for individuals in country 1. There are
two effects driving this. First, an increase in M1 increases the marginal damage for country
2 and, ceteris paribus, works towards reducing consumption of the dirty good in country 2.
However, because the increase in M1 will reduce consumption of the dirty good in country
1, this reduction may offset the effect on D′2(.) sufficiently to allow country 2 to actually
increase its consumption of the dirty good. From the condition given in (34) we see that
this is the case if consumption in country 1 is sufficiently low. The lower consumption in
country 1, the less an increase in their population will affect marginal damage of country 2
and therefore the more likely it is that the resulting decrease in consumption in country 1 is
sufficient to allow country 2 to increase its consumption of the dirty good.
Global Social Planner
When considering the Global Planner it makes intuitive sense that if the population in any
of the countries increases, this leads to an increase in global marginal damage and therefore
consumption of the dirty good by each individual in each country has to decrease under
a global social optimum. Formally, in the two-country case, the change in consumption in











φ′′2 (.) − M1 M2 D′′1 (.) − M22 D′′2 (.)




1 (.) + M1 M2 D′′2 (.)
] < 0,
(35)
and similarly it can be shown that ∂ zˆ
G
2
∂M1 < 0. This also demonstrates that any differences in
the amount of change between the two countries as a result of the population increase in
country 1 is only driven by the private preferences over the dirty good. This is consistent with
the earlier finding that in a global equilibrium differences in consumption are only caused by
differences in the private benefit from consumption of the dirty good as well as differences
in the cost of production.21
Comparison of the Domestic and Global Planner
In general it is intuitive that average consumption across the two countries will always
be lower under the global equilibrium compared to the domestic equilibrium because the
Global Planner internalises more damage than each of the Domestic Planners. However, it is
21 Since the cost of production is assumed to be a constant, it has no impact on the degree to which optimal
consumption changes as the result of a population increase.
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theoretically possible that, for example, consumption in country 1 could be higher under the
Global Planner than under the Domestic Planner. This would be the case if the size of country
1 is sufficiently large relative to country 2 such that the domestic equilibrium would have
a very low level of consumption in country 1 and a comparatively high level in country 2.
The Global Planner’s equilibrium would then redistribute this imbalance and allow country
1 to consume more, but of course require country 2 to consume less. This is because a large
country 1 internalises its own experienced damage fully (although it ignores its effect on
the other countries) while a global optimum equally shares the burden of global emissions
(which are disproportionately caused by country 1 in this example). Note that this may be
different if country 1 has a ‘lower’ damage function compared to country 2.
Formally, using the two-country setup and assuming for simplicity that both countries
have the same damage function, the requirement for zˆG1 < zˆD1 is
M1
M1 + M2 <
D′
(




M1 zˆD1 + M2 zˆD2
) . (36)
After having established how the equilibria react to changes in the population size under
standard theory, let us know explore the same in the case of Pure Altruism.
5.2 Pure Altruism
Domestic Social Planner
Again turning to the case of only two countries, we find that the change in the domestic





















Since we know that AD1 AD2 < 1 from the restriction put on the total level of altruistic
concern we also know that, as in the case without altruism, an increase in consumption
in country 1 leads to a decrease in domestically optimal consumption of the dirty good in













1 − AD1 AD2
) [




Similar to the findings under standard theory, it is not clear whether consumption in country




∂M1 > 0 is given by
−φ′′1 (.) <
(
1 − AD1 AD2
) [




1(.) + AD2 M1z1 D′′1 (.) + M2z1 D′′2 (.)
, (39)
where of course the left hand side is a positive value. While this condition is not straight-
forward to interpret, the intuition is the same as for the case without altruism. If country 1
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is sufficiently large or the marginal damage in country 1 is sufficiently high relative to the
private benefit of consumption in country 1 and the size and marginal damage in country 2,
the decrease in consumption in country 1 can be such that country 2 could actually increase
consumption of the dirty good under a Domestic Planner. Of course the levels of altruistic
concern the two countries have for themselves and the other country influences how much a
country changes its consumption of the dirty good.22
Global Social Planner
In the case of the global optimum, we find that the effect of a population increase in country





















where |HG | =φ′′1 (.)
[











2 = 1 we can see that the second part of the numerator falls away. Note that
the only differences between (40) and (37) are the altruism parameters AD and AG . With









1(.) + AG2 M1z1 D′′1 (.) + M2z1 D′′2 (.)
]}
< 0. (41)
Therefore optimal consumption falls in both countries as a result of a population increase
in either country. This is consistent with Global Planner results under standard theory shown
in Sect. 5.1.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that while individual behaviour is unaffected by altruism in the multi-
country setting, meaning individuals will free-ride in the absence of a tax on the dirty good
regardless of their level of altruistic concern for others, determining the optimal level of
consumption of the dirty good for both a non-cooperative and cooperative welfare maximising
solution, as well as determining the right tax to induce that level, becomes more complex.
At the same time, individual behaviour is unaffected due to the atomistic nature of the
consumption decision. Therefore no matter how much they may care about the welfare
of others, in their country or another, their consumption choice has no impact on global
emissions, and thus the chosen consumption level is only determined by the private marginal
benefit and cost of consumption.
22 Also note that if both AD1 = 0 and AD2 = 0, then the condition described in (39) reduces to that shown in(34).
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Given the global nature of climate change, non-cooperating governments might maximise
domestic welfare, taking consumption in other countries as given. However the social opti-
mum is determined by the global cooperative solution where global welfare is maximised for
each country simultaneously. With or without altruism, the global optimum implies lower
average consumption compared to non-cooperative solution. While individuals will free-ride
on the damage their consumption causes, governments maximising domestic welfare only
will also free-ride on the damage caused to other countries. Under standard theory the Domes-
tic Planner will only internalise domestic damage, while a Global Planner will internalise
global damage completely and differences in optimal consumption are only caused by differ-
ences in private preferences and the cost of production of the dirty good. Therefore the global
optimum can be induced by a single tax rate on the dirty good for everyone globally, equal
to global marginal damage from the dirty good. This is a common result in the literature.
However, this paper has shown that if individuals exhibit altruistic concern for the utility
of others, both the non-cooperative solution as well as the global optimum will change. If
individuals exhibit altruistic concern for the welfare of other countries, then the Domestic
planners’ non-cooperative solution will internalise the damage caused to other countries
depending on the level of altruistic concern for that country relative to the altruistic concern
for their own country and their own private utility. Yet the Domestic Planner will never
fully internalise global damage if there are more than two countries. Altruistic concern for
other countries effectively increases the damage individuals experience as they will not just
be affected by the damage they experience directly, but also the damage others experience.
Consequently, even the Domestic Planner has to take account of damage caused to other
countries. The key result, however, is that the global optimum is affected by the existence
of altruistic concern for the same reasons. Effectively altruism means that global damage
is now not the simple sum of all the individual damage functions but the weighting has to
be adjusted for the damage experienced via altruistic concern for others. This depends on
the relative levels of altruistic concern each country has for their own country and for other
countries, and means that unless for each country the altruistic concern for their own country
is the same as for all other countries, the global optimum will be different from standard
theory. From this it also follows that although altruistic concern leads the Domestic Planner
to internalise some of the damage, the gap between the non-cooperative solution and the
global optimum may not narrow. Furthermore, this paper has shown that with altruism the
global optimum can no longer be achieved by a single tax equal global marginal damage,
but it has to be adjusted for each country depending on the levels of altruistic concern. This
significantly increases the information policy makers require to set the right tax on emissions
even if a global cooperative solution could be achieved.
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